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ABSTRACT
Speech signals are a rich source of speaker-related information
including sensitive attributes like identity or accent. With a small
amount of found speech data, such attributes can be extracted and
modeled for malicious purposes like voice cloning, spoofing, etc.
In this paper, we investigate speaker anonymization strategies based
on voice conversion. In contrast to prior evaluations, we argue that
different types of attackers can be defined depending on the ex-
tent of their knowledge about the conversion scheme. We compare
two frequency warping-based conversion methods and a deep learn-
ing based method in three attack scenarios. The utility of the con-
verted speech is measured through the word error rate achieved by
automatic speech recognition, while privacy protection is assessed
by state-of-the-art speaker verification techniques (i-vectors and x-
vectors). Our results show that voice conversion schemes are unable
to effectively protect against an attacker that has extensive knowl-
edge of the type of conversion and how it has been applied, but may
provide some protection against less knowledgeable attackers.
Index Terms— privacy, voice conversion, speech recognition,
speaker verification, attacker
1. INTRODUCTION
Dramatic improvements in speech synthesis [1], voice cloning [2, 3]
and speaker recognition [4] that leverage “found data” pose a severe
privacy threat to the users of pervasive speech interfaces [5]. Speaker
anonymization or de-identification [6–8] refers to the task of con-
cealing the speaker’s identity from an attacker while retaining the
linguistic content. The anonymized data should prevent an attacker
from recognizing the speaker while preserving the perceived speech
naturalness and intelligibility and/or the performance of downstream
tasks such as automatic speech recognition (ASR).
Fang et al. [9] classify speaker anonymization methods into two
categories: physical vs. logical. Physical methods perturb speech
in the physical space by adding acoustic noise, while logical meth-
ods apply a transformation to the recorded signal. Among the latter,
voice conversion (VC) methods have been traditionally exploited as
a way to map the input voice (source) into that of another speaker
(target) [10–12]. In contrast to feature-domain approaches [8], the
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output of VC remains a speech waveform and it may be used for
listening or transcription purposes. The anonymized speech should
thus sound as natural and intelligible as possible [13].
Crucially, all previous anonymization studies were conducted
in a weak attack scenario where the attacker is unaware that an
anonymization method has been applied to the found data [9]. This
raises the concern that the privacy protection may entirely rely on
the secrecy of the design and implementation details of the voice
transformation scheme, a principle known as “security by obscu-
rity” [14] that has long been rejected by the security community.
There is therefore a strong need to evaluate the robustness of the
anonymization to the knowledge that the adversary may have about
the transformation scheme. In practice, such knowledge may for
instance be acquired by inspecting the code embedded in the user’s
device or in an open-source implementation.
As opposed to previous studies, we hypothesize several types
of attackers based on their knowledge of the anonymization method
that has been applied to the speech data, and place them on a con-
tinuum. At one end, an Ignorant attacker is unaware of the speech
transformation being applied to the incoming data, while at the other
end an Informed attacker can leverage the complete knowledge of
the transformation algorithm while training and testing. In the mid-
dle, a Semi-Informed attacker may know the voice transformation
algorithm but not its exact parameter values. In our experimental
study, we evaluate three VC methods with different target speaker
selection strategies in various attack scenarios. In each scenario, we
assess how well each method is capable of protecting the speaker’s
identity against attackers that leverage state-of-the-art speaker verifi-
cation techniques based on i-vectors or x-vectors [4]. We also report
the word error rate (WER) achieved by a state-of-the-art end-to-end
automatic speech recognizer [15]. While a formal listening test is
beyond the scope of this paper, we do make a few samples of con-
verted speech available for informal comparison.1
In Section 2, we describe the three VC methods we evaluate in
the context of anonymization. Section 3 introduces possible target
speaker selection strategies and the hypothesized attack scenarios.
Section 4 presents the experimental setting and the results. We con-
clude in Section 5.
2. VOICE CONVERSION METHODS
The criteria for selecting the VC methods in our study are that they
must be 1) non-parallel, i.e., do not require a parallel corpus of sen-
tences uttered by both the source and target speakers for training —
1https://github.com/brijmohan/adaptive_voice_
conversion/tree/master/samples
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this is important from a privacy perspective since there exist few par-
allel corpora and selecting openly available targets would increase
the risk of an inversion attack; 2) many-to-many, i.e., allow conver-
sion between arbitrary sources and targets so that any speaker in a
large corpus can be selected as the target ; 3) source- and language-
independent, i.e., do not require enrollment sentences for the source
speaker and do not rely on language-specific ASR or phoneme clas-
sification — this is important from a usability perspective as it frees
the user from the burden of enrolling and it is applicable to any lan-
guage (including under-resourced ones), and from a privacy perspec-
tive since enrollment translates into the storage of a voiceprint which
poses even greater privacy threats.
The third criterion is quite strict: many VC methods, such as
StarGAN-VC [16] or the ASR-based method in [9], do not satisfy
it. We found that the vocal tract length normalization (VTLN) based
methods in [12, 17] and the one-shot method in [18] satisfy all cri-
teria. In this paper, we use models trained over English speech [19]
but do not use any other linguistic resources such as transcriptions.
2.1. VoiceMask
VoiceMask is described in [12] as the frequency warping method
based on the composition of a log-bilinear function, expressed
as f(ω, α) = | − i ln z−α
1−αz |, and a quadratic function, given by
g(ω, β) = ω+β(ω
pi
− (ω
pi
)2). Here ω ∈ [0, pi] is the normalized fre-
quency, α ∈ [−1, 1] is the warping factor for the bilinear function,
z = eiω , and β > 0 is the warping factor for the quadratic function.
Therefore, the warping function is of the form g(f(ω, α), β). The
two parameters, α and β, are chosen uniformly at random from a
predefined range which is found to produce intelligible speech while
perceptually concealing the speaker identity. In the following, we
apply this transform to the spectral envelope rather than the pitch-
synchronous spectrum as in the original paper. In addition, we apply
logarithm Gaussian normalized pitch transformation (see [20]) so as
to match the pitch statistics of a target speaker2.
The authors claim that this transformation is difficult to inverse
when the parameter values are unknown because they are randomly
selected from a large interval. However, VoiceMask uses the same
parameter values to warp the spectra at each time step of the utter-
ance. This approach is quite limited to conceal the identity of the
source speaker and to mimic the target speaker because it warps the
entire frequency axis in a single direction.
2.2. VTLN-based voice conversion
VTLN-based VC [17] represents each speaker by a set of centroid
spectra extracted using the CheapTrick [21] algorithm for k pseudo-
phonetic classes. These classes are learned in an unsupervised
fashion by clustering all speech frames of all utterances from this
speaker. For each class of the source speaker, the procedure finds the
class of the target speaker and the warping parameters that minimize
the distance between the transformed source centroid spectrum and
the target centroid spectrum. All speech frames in that class are then
warped using a power function. Similarly to above, we apply this
warping to the spectral envelope and also perform Gaussian normal-
ized pitch transformation so as to match the pitch statistics of the
target. Compared to VoiceMask, this approach warps the frequency
axis in different directions over time. The parameters of this method
include the number of classes k and the chosen target speaker.
2Strictly speaking, VoiceMask is a voice transformation method rather
than a VC method: pitch is converted from the source speaker to a target
speaker, but the spectral envelope is not related to a particular target speaker.
2.3. Disentangled representation based voice conversion
The third approach is based on disentangled representation of speech
as proposed in [18, 22]. The central idea of this work is that speaker
information is statically present throughout the utterance but content
information is dynamic. This approach is based on a neural network
transformation and uses a speaker encoder and a content encoder to
separate the factors of variation corresponding to speaker and con-
tent information. The content encoder uses instance normalization to
cancel out the speaker effect and the speaker encoder uses average
pooling to learn global information. During training, an utterance X
is fed to the two encoders in parallel and the output embeddings are
passed through a decoder to reconstruct X . Then, to map a source
utterance to a target speaker, the source utterance is fed to the con-
tent encoder and a target utterance to the speaker encoder. The re-
sulting embeddings are passed through the decoder which generates
converted speech whose linguistic content corresponds to the source
and speaker identity to the target. The only parameter of this method
is the chosen target speaker.
3. TARGET SELECTION STRATEGIES AND ATTACKERS
In the context of this study, we consider that the VC function and
the sets of possible parameter values are known to all users. Each
user records his/her voice on his/her device and performs a VC step
before sending it to a public database. An attacker tries to identify
which converted utterances in this public database are spoken by a
particular user. To this end, he/she has access to a small amount of
found speech from this user (and potentially some additional pub-
lic resources, such as benchmark speech processing datasets to train
generic speaker models).
In the following, we define three parameter selection (a.k.a. tar-
get selection) strategies for the three VC methods above, which can
be seen as key ingredients of a “private-by-design” speech process-
ing system. We then describe the knowledge that an attacker trying
to compromise the system could have about the VC function and the
target selection strategy.
3.1. Target selection strategies
We consider three possible target selection strategies. In strategy
const, the VC function is constant across all users and all utterances.
This means choosing a unique target speaker and, in the case of
VoiceMask, fixed values for α and β. In strategy perm, the con-
version parameters are chosen at random once by each user. In other
words, when a user downloads the VC module on his/her device,
he/she selects a personal target speaker and, in the case of Voice-
Mask, personal random values for α and β. Finally, in the random
strategy, each time a user applies VC to an utterance, a random set
of parameters is drawn, i.e., a random target speaker is selected and,
in the case of VoiceMask, random values are drawn for α and β.
3.2. Attacker knowledge
We define the types of attackers based on the extent of their knowl-
edge about the VC function and its parameters. An Ignorant attacker
is not aware that VC has been applied at all. In contrast, an Informed
attacker knows the VC method and its exact parameter values (i.e.,
the chosen target speaker and the values of α and β). One may argue
that an Informed attacker is not very realistic (except for the const
strategy), while an Ignorant attacker is very weak. Between these
two extreme cases, various types of attackers can be defined. For
instance, we consider a Semi-Informed attacker who knows the cho-
sen VC method (VoiceMask, VTLN, or disentangled representation)
and the target selection strategy (const, perm, or random), but not the
actual target (i.e., the actual target speaker or the value of α and β).
This is arguably more realistic since the VC algorithm and the target
selection strategy may be open-source, while (except for the const
strategy) the target chosen by the user is much less easily accessible.
It is important to note that many concrete instances of attackers
of the above types can be designed, and finding out the “best” at-
tacker of a particular type is a hard problem. In the experiments sec-
tion, we propose attackers exploiting these different levels of knowl-
edge based on the assumptions defined above. A more exhaustive
investigation of the design of attackers is left for future work.
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
4.1. Data and evaluation setup
All experiments are performed on the LibriSpeech corpus [19]. We
use the 460 h clean training set (train-clean-100 + train-clean-360),
which contains 1,172 speakers, to train the disentanglement trans-
form. Out of the test-clean set, we create an enrollment set (438 ut-
terances) and a trial set (1,496 utterances) with different utterances
from the same 29 speakers (13 male and 16 female, not in the train-
ing set) considered as source speakers. The target speakers for all
three VC methods are randomly picked from the training and test-
clean sets. See [8] for more details.
For each VC method and target selection strategy, all utterances
in the trial set are mapped to possibly different target speakers in
the training or trial set. The converted trial set serves as the public
database that attackers want to de-anonymize. To this end, attackers
have access to the enrollment set which serves as the found data used
to model the speakers in the trial set.
The attackers also have access to the 460 h training set to train
state-of-the-art speaker verification methods based on x-vectors [4]
and i-vectors, which are stronger than the Gaussian mixture model-
universal background model (GMM-UBM) based method used in
the seminal work of [13]. We adapt the sre16 Kaldi recipe for train-
ing x-vectors and i-vectors to LibriSpeech.3 We use a smaller net-
work architecture for x-vector computation than the original recipe.
Specifically, compared to the architecture in [4, Table 1], we re-
move the frame4, frame5 and segment7 layers, thereby also reduc-
ing the stats pooling layer to 512T×1024 and the segment6 layer to
1024×512. Here T refers to the utterance-level context. This re-
duced architecture performs slightly better on LibriSpeech than the
architecture in the original recipe. We give more details on the dif-
ferent attackers in Section 4.3.
Finally, we evaluate the utility of each VC method in terms of
the resulting ASR performance on the converted data. We use a hy-
brid connectionist temporal classification (CTC) and attention based
encoder-decoder [15] trained on the converted 460 h training set us-
ing the standard recipe for LibriSpeech provided in ESPnet4.
4.2. Voice conversion settings
VoiceMask. Pitch, aperiodicity and spectral envelope are extracted
using the pyworld vocoder.5 We follow strategy random only. We
3https://github.com/brijmohan/kaldi/tree/master/
egs/librispeech_spkv/v2
4https://espnet.github.io/espnet/
5https://github.com/JeremyCCHsu/
Python-Wrapper-for-World-Vocoder
sample α uniformly such that |α| ∈ [0.08, 0.10] then β in [−2, 2]
such that 0.32 ≤ distfα,β ≤ 0.40where distfα,β =
∫ pi
0
|fα,β(ω)−
ω| is the distortion strength of the warping function. These ranges
are provided by VoiceMask’s authors in [12] since they produce most
intelligible output. A subset of 100 target speakers is randomly se-
lected and, for every utterance, pitch is transformed so as to match a
random speaker within that subset. Other target selections strategies
have not been applied because fixed values for α and β (whether
speaker-dependent or not) are prone to inversion attacks.
VTLN-based VC. Pitch, aperiodicity and spectral envelope are
extracted using the pyworld vocoder. For each speaker, we collect
speech frames using energy-based voice activity detection (VAD)
with a threshold of 0.06. We cluster the corresponding spectral en-
velopes via k-means with k = 8. In strategy const, only one target
speaker is selected. In perm, we draw a random subset of 100 tar-
get speakers and, for each source speaker, we select a random target
within it. In random, we draw a random subset of 100 target speak-
ers and, for each source utterance, we select a random target within
it.
Disentangled representation based VC. We use a publicly
available implementation of this method6. As per the authors’ sug-
gestion in the preprocessing script, we train the disentanglement
models (speaker encoder, content encoder, decoder) over the train-
clean-100 subset of the LibriTTS corpus (itself a subset of the 460 h
training set of LibriSpeech), with a batch size of 128 and learning
rate of 0.0005 for 500,000 iterations. All three target selection strate-
gies are applied similarly to VTLN-based VC except that only the
source utterance and one random utterance from the target speaker
are used as inputs to the content and speaker encoders, respectively.
Other utterances from the source and targets speakers are unused.
4.3. Attackers
We have implemented several attackers depending on the choice of
the VC algorithm and the target selection strategy as well as the ex-
tent of the attacker’s knowledge (Informed, Semi-Informed or Ig-
norant). Our Ignorant attacker is unaware of the VC step: he/she
simply trains x-vector/i-vector models on the untransformed train-
ing set, and applies them to the untransformed enrollment set. Our
Semi-Informed attacker knows the VC algorithm and the target selec-
tion strategy (const, random or perm) but not the particular choices
of targets. He/she applies this strategy to the training and enrollment
sets by drawing random target speakers from the subset of 100 target
speakers used by the VC method (we assume that the value of k in
VTLN is known to the attacker). As a result, the training and en-
rollment data are converted in a similar way as the trial data, but the
target speaker associated with every speaker in the enrollment set is
typically different from that associated with the same speaker in the
converted trial set. Finally, our Informed attacker has access to the
actual VC models and target choices used to anonymize the trial set,
so it converts the training and enrollment sets accordingly.
In our preliminary experiments, we also considered attackers
who convert the enrollment set only and use x-vector/i-vector models
trained on the untransformed training set. Unsurprisingly, we found
that this leads to significantly larger equal error rates (EER) than re-
training the x-vector/i-vector model (which can easily be done by the
attacker using public benchmark data). Therefore, we do not report
results for such attackers below.
6https://github.com/jjery2243542/adaptive_voice_
conversion
Table 1. EER (%) achieved using x-vector based speaker verification.
VoiceMask VTLN-based VC Disentangl.-based VC
Attackers ↓ / Strategies→ random const perm random const perm random
Informed 5.01 4.71 3.91 6.32 4.71 0.20 5.52
Semi-Informed - 12.84 23.37 6.32 13.64 43.03 5.42
Ignorant 28.69 24.27 30.99 27.38 27.68 32.20 30.59
Table 2. EER (%) achieved using i-vector based speaker verification.
VoiceMask VTLN-based VC Disentangl.-based VC
Attackers ↓ / Strategies→ random const perm random const perm random
Informed 8.22 6.22 10.23 9.84 4.71 0.20 11.03
Semi-Informed - 18.25 31.49 18.76 15.65 43.93 10.53
Ignorant 50.55 26.08 49.15 49.15 49.95 47.74 49.85
Table 3. WER (%) achieved using end-to-end ASR.
VoiceMask VTLN-based VC Disentangl.-based VC
Subset ↓ / Strategies→ random const perm random const perm random
test-clean 18.1 19.8 18.4 15.9 41.5 23.7 115.1
4.4. Results and discussion
We first train and apply the ASR and speaker verification systems
on the original (untransformed) data for baseline performance. We
obtain an EER of 4.61% and 4.31% for i-vector and x-vector, re-
spectively, and a WER of 9.4% for ASR.
Tables 1 and 2 present the EER for x-vector and i-vector speaker
verification systems for the three attackers and the various choices
of VC methods and target selection strategies. Interestingly, the
Informed attacker achieves EER values similar to (or even slightly
lower than) the baseline. This indicates that, when the attacker has
complete knowledge of the VC scheme and target speaker mapping,
none of the VC methods is able to protect the speaker identity. While
an attacker with such complete knowledge is not very realistic in
most practical cases, our results show that speaker information has
not been totally removed and is somehow still present in the con-
verted speech.
For the more realistic Semi-Informed attacker, we observe that
strategy perm is quite effective in protecting privacy and shows the
highest gains in EER. This is due to the fact that the target speaker in
the enrolled data may not be same as the one in trial, hence greater
confusion is induced during inference. We also notice that strat-
egy random is not much affected by the change of speaker mapping,
which is intuitive because in this case the utterances are already be-
ing mapped randomly to different speakers. Such mapping would be
ineffective due to averaging of randomness. Strategy const is also
slightly affected by the change of mapping because the training and
enrollment speaker is not same as that of test speaker, but the effect
is not as significant as strategy perm.
Consistently with previous results of the literature, the Ignorant
attacker performs worst with respect to EER. This confirms that,
when the attacker is oblivious to the privacy-preserving mechanism,
we can protect speaker identity completely. Figure 1 shows the i-
vector score distribution for genuine and impostor trials. We observe
that the overlap between the two distributions increases as we move
from the Informed to the Ignorant attacker.
Table 3 gives the WER obtained for each VC method, which
we use as a proxy for the usefulness of the converted speech. Note
that there is no difference between converted data in different attack
scenarios, hence the WER does not depend on the attacker. Voice-
Mask and VTLN-based VC achieve reasonable WER compared to
the untransformed data, while the disentangled representation based
(a) Informed (b) Semi-Informed (c) Ignorant
Fig. 1. I-vector score distribution for trials conducted on VTLN
(strategy random) converted data by Informed, Semi-Informed, or Ig-
norant attackers. The orange distribution indicates impostor scores,
while the blue distribution indicates genuine scores. The crossing
between the two curves indicates the threshold for EER. More over-
lap means greater confusion, hence greater privacy protection.
VC produces unreasonably high WER. Note that these WERs are
achieved when ASR is trained solely using converted data. In prac-
tice, many techniques can be used optimize the WER, such as using
converted data to augment clean data.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We investigated the use of VC methods to protect the privacy of
speakers by concealing their identity. We formally defined target
speaker selection strategies and attack scenarios based on the knowl-
edge of attacker. Our experimental results indicate that both aspects
play an important role in the strength of the protection. Simple meth-
ods such as VTLN-based VC with appropriate target selection strat-
egy can provide reasonable protection against attackers with partial
knowledge.
Our characterization of strategies and attack scenarios opens up
several avenues for future research. To increase the naturalness of
converted speech, we can explore intra-gender VC as well as the
use of a supervised phonetic classifier in VTLN. We also plan to
conduct experiments with a broader range of attackers to precisely
evaluate the privacy protection in various scenarios. More gener-
ally, designing a privacy-preserving transformation which induces
a large overlap between genuine and impostor distributions even in
the Informed attack scenario remains an open question. In the case
of disentangled representations, this calls for avoiding any leakage
of private attributes into the content embeddings.
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